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LOSS DEDUCTION ON THE SALE OF AN ABANDONED RESIDENCE:
CASE-LAW THINKING IN STATUTORY ]INTERPRETATION
EDWARD T. ROEHNERt
SHEILA M. ROEHNERt
INTRODUCTION
Goodhart, familiar with both English and American legal procedure, has
written that the case system requires a learned bar on which the bench can
rely, and that the English courts, more fortunate in their practising bar than
the American courts, assume that their sole duty is to decide the issue on
the arguments of counsel.' Since the complexity of the tax law is common-
place, 2 judges sitting in tax cases are especially entitled to a highly-trained
bar,3 but the Tax Court has instead been compelled to complain that it cannot
always do the work of counsel.4
t Member of New York Bar.
1. "The case system . . . requires a learned bar on which the bench can rely. Judicial
work becomes overwhelming if the judge must depend on his own research for the relevant
authorities. In England, with a practicing bar limited to a few hundred barristers of
ability and experience, the courts are free to assume that their sole duty is to determine the
issue on the arguments advanced by counsel.... In America there are as many able lawyers
as there are in England, but there is also a far larger number of less competent ones.
Unfortunately, it is of frequent occurrence that the cases which are of the greatest
importance to law as a science are argued by lawyers of the second class. In deciding the
cases the courts too often must rely upon themselves." Goodhart, Case Law In England
and America, 15 Corn. L.Q. 173, 192 (1930).
2. "[Flor the first time in the history of the federal income tax we are becoming really
aware of its anatomical structure, so to speak. Once we isolate and identify the fundamental
technical premises underlying the tax treatment of business and family arrangements, we
are then in a position to evaluate the soundness of those premises and to agree upon the
changes required." Surrey and Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law
Institute, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 768 (1953).
3. ".. . a judge rarely performs his functions adequately unless the case before him
is adequately presented." Brandeis, Business---A Profession 362 (1933 ed.)
"The ability and attainments of counsel will be reflected in the work of the Court, so
that the complete understanding of what fails from the bench involves some consideration
of the adequacy of presentation at the bar." Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme
Court 1862-1890 111 (1939).
4. See: Estate of William A. Hager, P-H 1946 TC Mem. Dec. 1 46,226 (1946) in
which Judge Murdock said that, as the case was argued, the issue was whether property
irrevocably transferred in trust prior to the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, with the
control of income retained for the life of the grantor, was includible in the gross estate of
the grantor, but that counsel for both sides had overlooked the Supreme Court decision
in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938) and U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.19 (1942), which
specifically excluded such transfer from a decedent's gross estate.
"He [counsel] may not safely rely upon the Tax Court to dig out and develop a case
for him. That is not the function of the Court, and it does not have the time or the
facilities to do the work of counsel." Producers Crop. Impr. Assn., 7 T.C. 562, 565 (1946).
"We conclude this opinion by pointing out what should be obvious. When counsel
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The task of ascertaining the effect of sections of the tax statute upon each
other, when the statute has been amended, is the task of counsel and of text-
writers, not of the court.5 The decisions on whether a loss on the sale of an
abandoned residence held for rent or sale is deductible under the Revenue
Act of 1942 illustrate the feebleness of that kind of aid furnished by counsel
and the textwriters.7 The cases hold that the loss is not deductible, and yet
it clearly is.8
DISCUSSION
Before the Revenue Act of 1942 treatment of abandoned residences fell into
three categories: (1) if the abandoned residence was rented before sale,
depreciation and maintenance expenses were allowable on the ground that
the property was used in a trade or business, and a loss on the sale was
allowable under 23(e)(1) as a loss incurred in a trade or business;0 (2) if
the residence was inherited, but not used as a residence after inheritance,
depreciation and maintenance expenses were not allowable, since the property
fails to do the initial research and brief the issues presented to the Court, to put it
mildly an undesirable situation arises. It is unfair to the Court, it is unfair to counsel's
clients, and it is unfair to the thousands of other taxpayers waiting to have their cases
heard. If the Court is required to do the initial research (the burden of which rests on
counsel) as well as its own independent research in cases as involved as this one an
impossible situation will arise." Morrisdale Coal Mining Co, 19 T.C. 203, 229 (1952).
"It is not the function of the Tax Court to dig out and develop a taxpayer's case." W. A.
Prater, P-H 1953 TC Mem. Dec. f 53,262 (1952).
5. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 Yale L.J. 167, 169 (1947): "In my own
case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before my
eyes in a meaningless procession; cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon excep-
tion-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind
only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which
it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most
inordinate expenditure of time. . . . Again and again I have found myself utterly
bewildered by the involution of phrase with phrase and of term with term . .. ." This
is the language of a judge whom judge Frank, of the same bench, has called, and none
will say him nay, the greatest living American judge. Frank-, Words and Music, 47 Col.
L. Rev. 1267 (1947).
6. Rex E. Warner v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1948); Allen L. Grammer
et al., 12 T.C. 34 (1949); William C. Horrmann et al., 17 T.C. 903 (1951); E. R. Fenimore
Johnson, 19 T.C. 93 (1952).
7. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 253, 260 (1953 ed.); Shaw, Sale or
Other Disposition of Residential Property, Proceedings of the Tax Institute of University
of Southern California, Major Tax Problems of 1951; Kriegh, Problems in Disposition of
Residence Property, Proceedings of New York University, Eleventh Annual Institute on
Federal Taxation (1953); 5 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 28.78 (1953 Rev.
ed.); Rabkin and Johnson, Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 43.09 (1951).
8. Any argument that this discussion is academic is invalid, since, the cases, having
been decided in ignorance of the fact that section 23(e)(2) was in effect amended by the
enactment of sections 23(1)(2) and 23(a)(2), are not binding, even under the strictest
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. See note 20 infra.
9. Fackler v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 708, aftd, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
was not used in a trade or business, but a loss on the sale was allowable under
23(e)(2) as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit; 10  (3) if the
residence was abandoned by the taxpayer, depreciation and maintenance
expenses were not allowable, since not connected with a trade or business, and
no loss on the sale was allowable, since there was no appropriation to income-
producing purposes until the property was rented or remodeled for business
purposes."
As to (3) above Judge Vinson 1 2 (later Chief Justice of the United States)
writing the opinion for a unanimous bench, said in Phipps v. Helvering'3 in
1941 that sections 23(e) (1) and 23(e) (2) must be read in connection with
section 24(a) (1), which disallows deductions for personal, living, or family
expenses. He then stated why the loss on the sale of an abandoned residence
was not deductible: 1 4
"The critical showing at the outset is not into what deductible subsection the loss
is to be placed, but that it [the residence] has been removed from the nondeductible
personal, living, or family expense classification. Whether the property has been
removed from this nondeductible classification is the very essence of the appro-
priated-for-a-business-use test."
The reason the Board of Tax Appeals allowed losses under (2) on the sale of
an inherited residence was that, not having been occupied by the taxpayer as a
10. In Robert W. Williams, Ex'r, 1 B.T.A. 1101 (1925) the Board of Tax Appeals
allowed the taxpayer a loss on the sale of a residence she had inherited from her deceased
husband and immediately offered for rent or sale. In Robert H. Montgomery, 37 B.T.A.
232 (1938), the taxpayer argued that he was entitled to deduct depredation and maintenance
expenses on the property given him by his wife which he had immediately offered for
rent or sale. He considered the Williams opinion controlling. The Board distinguished
the Williams case, saying that the test for determining whether the loss on the sale was
deductible was whether it was sustained in a transaction entered into for profit, but that
deductions for depredation and maintenance expenses were allowed only if incurred in a
trade or business. The taxpayer tried the issue for another taxable year in the Court of
Claims, but that court followed the Board. Robert H. Montgomery v. United States, 23
F. Supp. 130 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
11. Morgan v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1935); Rumsey v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1936); Schmidapp v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cr. 1938);
Phipps v. Helvering, 124 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Gevirtz v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 707
(2d Cir. 1941). In the Morgan and Rumsey cases the Fifth and Second Circuit Courts
observed that the taxpayer could have resumed residential uses at will, that it was not as
if he had remodeled the building for business purposes or rented it. But in the Schmtdlapp
case the Second Circuit Court observed that, if the matter were new, putting the
property in the hands of a broker might be regarded as itself the inception of a transaction
entered into for profit, but that the Rumsey case was the other way.
12. He was chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means which
considered revenue legislation and won wide renown in the House of Representatives as a
tax expert. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1953.
13. 124 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
14. 124 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1941). "Very rarely the actual words in which a
famous judge formulated a rule are treated almost as equivalent to a section of a statute."
Lawson, The Rational Strength of English Law 16 (1951).
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residence after inheritance, the property never had to be removed from the
personal classification.
The test that Judge Vinson laid down applied to cases decided before the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942. That Act, however, added sections
23(1) (2) to allow depreciation and 23(a) (2) to allow maintenance expenses
on property held for the production of income. The Tax Court has interpreted
these sections as allowing deductions for depreciation and maintenance expen-es
on an abandoned residence held for rent or for rent or sale.'0 It refuses, however,
to allow deductions for a loss on those residences, on the ground that 23(e) (2),
which allows deductions for losses in transactions entered into for profit, was
not amended.' 6 Thus, when a taxpayer abandons a residence and offers it for
rent or for rent or sale he deducts depreciation and maintenance expenses,
and yet when he sells the residence he is not allowed a deduction for a loss
on the sale.
This anomalous result is not directed by the Code. Once the Code was
amended to permit deductions for depreciation and maintenance expenses on
an abandoned residence held for rent or for rent or sale the property was
taken out of the non-deductible personal classification and brought within the
sweep of section 23(e) (2), for the profit motive has been established.' 7 But
in none of the cases in which a loss on the sale has been sought, has it been
pointed out to the court that no amendment to 23(e) (2) was necessary. 8
Instead, it has been accepted that the earlier cases still retained vitality. In
fact, in the Warner"0 case, the one case to go up on appeal, the taxpayer in
his brief told the Second Circuit that its decisions in 1936 and 1938 in the
Rumsey and Schmidlapp cases correctly stated the law. The argument was
advanced, however, that the taxpayer in the Warner case had so clearly
abandoned the residence without intent to return that the loss deduction
should be allowed. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed on the authority
of the Rumsey and Schmidlapp cases. Nevertheless, if deductions for deprecia-
tion and maintenance expenses are allowable, the Warner decision is not
precedent in the Second Circuit, since the effect of sections 23(1) (2) and
23(a) (2) on 23(e) (2) were not presented to the court.20
15. Mary Laughlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943), reviewed by the court, after remand
by the Third Circuit Court, 134 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1943) to determine the effect of the
1942 Act; William C. Horrmann et aL, 17 T.C. 903 (1951). Cf. "Where the taxpayer's
home has been vacated and listed for rent or sale, it seems that no depreciation is deductible
while the property is unoccupied." Engel, Ownership Operation of Real Estate, Proceed-
ings of New York University, Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 333 (1949).
16. Rea E. Warner v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1948).
17. "The curiosity of the scientist is usually directed toward seeking an understanding
of things or relationships which he notices have no satisfactory explanation. . . . That
strong desire scientists usually have to seek underlying principles in masses of data not
obviously related may be regarded as an adult form of sublimation of curiosity." Beveridge,
The Art of Scientific Investigation 61 (1950).
18. "History is not the accumulation of facts but the relation of them." Strachey,
Portraits in Miniature 160 (1931).
19. 167 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1948).
20. Even the House of Lords, which considers itself bound by its own decisions,
1954]
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Professor Surrey, Dean Warren, and the other textwriters have swallowed
these aberrant decisions.21 Unlike other fields of law, in federal taxation the
critical function is absent far too often. Surrey and Warren discuss the Horr-
mann22 case, in which the taxpayer abandoned his residence and attempted to
rent or sell it, selling the property at a loss after three years. They write that
the Tax Court held that the efforts to rent or sell did not initiate "a transaction
entered into for profit," so that the loss was not allowable under section
23(e) (2), but did result in causing the property to be "held for the production
of income," so that depreciation was allowable under section 23(1)(2) and
maintenance expenses under section 23(a)(2). A few pages earlier they had
said that the allowance of losses sustained in the pursuit of gain is similar
to the allowance under section 23(a)(2) of expenses incurred in the produc-
tion of income, but that the Tax Court had held in the Horrmann case that
"held for the production of income" is broader than "transaction entered into
for profit."'23 They continue that "the difference in the description of the
profit-seeking activity prevents the two sections from being exactly cotermi-
nous, though they cover substantially the same area." It is interesting that
it does not seem to have occurred to them, or any of the other textwriters, to
wonder how once deductions are allowed for depreciation and maintenance
expense on the "profit-seeking activity" of holding property for the production
of income, the activity can be anything other than the initiation of a trans-
action entered into for profit. 24 Of course, as we have shown, it cannot be.25
considers that a decision given in ignorance of a controlling statute is not binding upon It,
the decision being considered as being on a question of fact, not of law. "In London
Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council [1898] A.C. 375, 380, when discussing
the question whether the House of Lords was bound by its own prior judgments, the
Earl of Halsbury, L.C., said: 'It is said that this House might have omitted to notice an
Act of Parliament or might have acted upon an Act of Parliament which was afterwards
found to have been repealed. It seems to me that the answer to that ingenious suggestion
is a very manifest one-namely, that that would be a mistake of fact. If the House were
under the impression that there was an Act when there was not such an Act as was
suggested, of course they would not be bound, when the fact was ascertained that there
was not such an Act or that the Act had been repealed, to proceed upon the hypothesis
that the Act existed.'" Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J.
161, 173 (1930).
21. Supra note 7.
22. 17 T.C. 903 (1951).
23. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 253 (1953 ed.).
24. The Surrey and Warren acceptance on page 260 of their casebook of the Tax Court
memorandum opinion in Helene Irwin Fagan, P-H 1950 TC Mem. Dec. 1 $0,017 (1949),
should be disregarded. Of that case they say that the court allowed maintenance expenses
under section 23(a)(2) on an unoccupied residence which had been listed for sale (as
opposed to rent or sale). That is correct, and the court also allowed depreciation. But
the Fagan case illustrates again the necessary dependence of the court upon counsel. The
opinion shows that the judge relied on Mary Laughlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 304 (1943), where
the property had been listed for rent or sale, and that he was not informed that under the
later decision in Warren Leslie, Sr., 6 T.C. 488 (1946), which had been reviewed by the
full bench and was therefore binding upon him, deductions for maintenance expenses were
[Vol. 23
Absurd results, moreover, flow from a rule that depreciation is allowable
on the value of property held for the production of income, but that the loss
on the sale is not allowable?8 Yet, judging by the opinions, in no case have
these absurdities been revealed to the court, nor do the textwriters refer to them.
One absurdity is that the theory of depreciation is violated by the rule.
That theory is that the loss on depreciable property instead of being taken
in the year of sale should be spread over the years that the property is held,
since a gradual loss is deemed to occur, excess depreciation or insufficient
depreciation to be accounted for in the year of sale.2 7 By disallowing a loss
on the sale and allowing a deduction for depreciation, the court is telling the
taxpayer that he is not entitled to recover the basis of the property and that
he is entitled to recover the basis of the property.28 This is the sort of thing
that gave Pavlov's dog a neurosis.
Another absurdity is that if after holding the property for the production
of income the taxpayer then rents the property he must take as a basis for
depreciation its then value to determine gain or loss on the sale, since only
then has he entered into a transaction. If the property was worth $75,000
when it became property held for the production of income, depreciation is
allowable on that amount (if it does not exceed cost); and if the property is
never sold the taxpayer may ultimately deduct the entire amount of $75,000
through depreciation. If, however, two years later he rents the property and
its then value is $60,000 the new basis for depreciation is $60,000. If $6,000
has been deducted as depreciation, what treatment is to be given the difference
of $9,000? Moreover, instead of worrying about the $9,000, since section
113(b) (1) (B) provides in determining the basis for loss for adjustment to the
held to be not allowable under section 23(a)(2) on property which had been listed for
sale alone. Two months after the Fagan case, a memorandum decision was entered in
John M. Coulter, P-H 1950 TC Mem. Dec. f 50,077 (1949), in which deductions for
depreciation and maintenance expenses were disallowed on property offered for sale alone
on the authority of the Leslie case. In the latest case on the subject, Charles F. Neave,
17 T.C. 1237 (1952), published in the same volume of the Tax Court reports as the
Horrmann case, ihe court again held that maintenance expenses are not allowable under
section 23(a) (2) on an unoccupied residence listed for sale.
25. "Here as elsewhere, names are 'noise and smoke'; the important point is to have
a clear and adequate conception of the fact signified by a name.") Huxley, Touchstone for
Ethics 69 (1947).
26. "I have in my mind cases in which the highest court seem to have floundered
because they had no clear idea of some of these themes. ' Holmes, Collected Legal Papers
196 (1921).
27. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(1)-1 (1953) provides that the proper allowance for
depredation of property used in the trade or business or held for the production of
income "is that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year in accordance with
a reasonably consistent plan (not necessarily at a uniform rate), whereby the aggregate
of the amounts so set aside plus the salvage value, will, at the end of the useful life of the
depreciable property, equal the cost or other basis of the property determined in accordance
with section 113."
28. Cf. William Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951), where the deduction for depreciation
was allowed but the loss on the sale was disallowed.
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basis for depreciation, is the lower value of the property at the time the
property is rented to be decreased by the $6,000 depreciation already taken?
If, however, the value at the time the abandoned residence becomes property
held for the production of income, adjusted for depreciation, is the basis for
determining gain or loss if the property is rented, all absurdities or problems
caused by the allowance for depreciation are dissolved. But that can be so
only if abandoning a residence and holding it for the production of income is
recognized as initiating a transaction entered into for profit.2 9
The 1953 Surrey and Warren treatment of gain or loss on the sale of a
residence as compared to its 1950 discussion shows the distortion to which tax
concepts are being subjected. The 1950 edition reads: 0
Gain Aspect
"It should be noted that the gain on the sale of a residence, even if sold qua
residence is always taxable. The amount of the gain is determined by reference
to the original cost, not adjusted for subsequent depreciation. Where a residence
converted to rental property is later sold, the basis for computing gain is the
original cost reduced only by depreciation subsequent to the conversion. See I.T.
2533, IX-1 Cum. Bull. 129 (1930)."
But the 1953 edition, which continues this language, inserts after the second
sentence:31
"In effect, the imputed income from the occupation of the residence, to the extent
it is reflected in depreciation of the residence, is subtracted from the taxpayer's
cost to reduce his loss in the case of a residence converted to rental property, but
is not subtracted to increase his gain."
Imputed income has nothing to do with it. The reduction in value of the
residence during occupation is a personal expense, as stated in I.T. 2533, cited
in the first quotation, and therefore the taxpayer is not entitled to a loss
deduction for the period of occupancy, but takes as a basis for loss the value
at the time the property is rented.3 2 Taxation is difficult enough without the
haze that comes from a leading casebook that drags in imputed income.83
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(e)-1(e) (1953) prescribes that the basis for computing
loss cannot exceed the original cost of the residence, or its value at the time of conversion,
whichever is lower. This rule was initially prescribed in Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582
(1928).
30. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 234 (1950 ed.).
31. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 261 (1953 ed.).
32. "[Tlhe cumbersome and determinedly imposing apparatus which is so often brought
into play, as if to establish some profound and penetrating insight, turns out, when reduced
to simple, clear and unpretentious terms, to be a quite commonplace observation." Adams,
Speaking of Books, N.Y. Times Book Review, Feb. 21, 1954, p. 2.
33. "One must select one's guide with care, even though the candidates for employment
are decked in the regalia of the schools." Cardozo, Growth of the Law 131 (1924).
"It is on the legal scholar that the tremendous burden of our case law falls in his attempt
to master comprehensively any large part of the field. So true is this that it must be
confessed that the encyclopedic legal minds seem to be disappearing, and knowledge of the
law as a system is becoming increasingly rare. Fortunately for the modern law student,
[Vol. 23
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that once depreciation and maintenance expenses on an abandoned
residence held for rent or sale became allowable as deductions, the property
was no longer held for personal use. A loss on the sale is therefore also allow-
able as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit.
the wealth of scholarship which since Langdefl's time has gone into the editing of casebooks
has not only made accessible to him the pure gold of legal principles, but has taught him
how to mine it for himself.
"The time has long since passed when judges or practicing lawyers are the mentors of
the profession. It is to the law schools that the legal profession must turn for guidance.
Practicing lawyers, judges, legislators, and administrators, businessmen, and labor leaders
may meet at the law schools to give common counsel, but it is to the law teachers that we
must ultimately turn for the continuing resynthesis of the law to meet modern needs."
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, Men and Measures in the Law 11, 29 (1949).
"More and more we are looking to the scholar in his study, to the jurist rather than
to the judge or lawyer, for inspiration and for guidance." Cardozo, Growth of the Law
11 (1924).
